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Court of Appeals
Division II
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

vs.

ANTHONY SAMNANG HEM,

Petitioner.

PETITION FOR REVIEW

Court of Appeals No. 49811-1-II
Appeal from the Superior Court of Pierce County
Superior Court Cause Number 15-1-02513-1
The Honorable Edmund Murphy, Judge

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I. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER

The Petitioner is Anthony Samnang Hem, Defendant and Appellant in the case below.

II. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

Petitioner seeks review of the unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division 2, case number 49811-1-II, which was filed on April 24, 2018 (attached in Appendix). The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction entered against Petitioner in the Pierce County Superior Court.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Did the State fail to meet its constitutional burden of proving that the decedent was not a participant in the crime of attempting to elude, where the State presented no evidence to establish that the decedent did not participate in the crime, and where the evidence instead showed that the decedent knowingly and voluntarily placed herself in the truck as it was being stolen, that the decedent stayed in the truck with the other participants for almost an hour and a half after it was stolen, and that the decedent did not remove herself from the truck even after the participants first attempted to flee the police?
2. Where nonparticipation by the decedent is an essential element of the crime of second degree felony murder, can the trier of fact convict a defendant if it merely finds insufficient proof of participation by the decedent?
3. Was the burden of proof improperly shifted to the defense, and was the State relieved of its constitutional burden of proof, when the court convicted Anthony Hem of second degree felony murder because he did not present sufficient

facts to establish that the decedent was a participant in the attempt to elude, instead of requiring the prosecutor to establish the essential fact that the decedent was *not* a participant in the crime of attempting to elude?

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The State charged Anthony Samnang Hem by Amended Information with one count of first degree robbery (RCW 9A.56.190, .200), one count of second degree felony murder (RCW 9A.32.050), one count of vehicular homicide (RCW 46.61.520), one count of vehicular assault (RCW 46.61.522), one count of second degree assault (RCW 9A.36.021), and one count of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle (RCW 46.61.024). (CP 26-30) The State alleged that the underlying felony for the second degree murder charge was attempting to elude, and alleged that the victim for both second degree murder and vehicular homicide was his passenger Marisa Richie. (CP 26-29)

Hem entered guilty pleas to vehicular homicide, vehicular assault, second degree assault, and attempting to elude. (CP 31-41; RP 91-108) Hem waived his right to a jury trial on the remaining counts. (CP 42; RP 86-89) Following a bench trial, the court found Hem guilty of first degree robbery and second degree

felony murder. (CP 82-89; RP 421-27)

At sentencing, the court merged the attempting to elude count with the second degree felony murder count. (RP 430; CP 79-81) But the trial court disagreed with Hem's argument that the second degree felony murder and vehicular homicide counts merged or were the same criminal conduct. (CP 74-78; RP 432-33) The trial court imposed a standard range sentence totaling 360 months of confinement, and imposed only mandatory legal financial obligations. (CP 95, 97; RP 442) Hem timely appealed. (CP 114) The Court of Appeals affirmed Hem's conviction and sentence.

B. SUBSTANTIVE FACTS

On May 9, 2015, Crystal Thomas and her friend Pierre Jennings spent the day driving around in Thomas' blue Monte Carlo. (CP 84; RP 136, 138) Around 11:00 that night, they picked up Marisa Richie and Anthony Hem. (RP 138; CP 84) Thomas drove the group to her brother-in-law's apartment complex in Lakewood. (RP 141, 142; CP 85) Thomas parked her car in what she thought was an available stall, and went inside the apartment to take a shower. (RP 148; CP 85)

A short time later, Terry Sumey arrived in his GMC pickup truck. (RP 197; CP 84) He saw the blue Monte Carlo parked in his

assigned spot. (RP 197, 199) He stopped, got out of his truck, and approached the Monte Carlo. (RP 201; CP 84)

Sumey noticed two men sitting in the front seats and a woman sitting in the back seat. (RP 202, 236; CP 84) He asked the man in the driver's seat to move the car, but the man said he did not have a key. (RP 201) After a short discussion, the driver exited the car and punched Sumey in the face. (RP 206-07, 234; CP 84) The other man then got out of the car, and the two men kicked Sumey repeatedly as he lay on the ground. (RP 208, 236-37; CP 84) The two men and the woman then jumped into Sumey's truck and fled. (RP 183, 339-40; CP 84)

Sumey went to a neighbor's house and called the police. (RP 209) The call was placed at 11:46 PM. (RP 125) Responding officers found a severely beaten Sumey, and noticed that the blue Monte Carlo was still parked in his stall. (RP 173) Thomas was also there, and she confirmed that Hem, Jennings and Richie had stayed in the Monte Carlo when she went inside the apartment. (RP 149, 150) Officers broadcast the description and license plate of Sumey's stolen truck. (RP 184)

Shortly after midnight, Officer Jeffrey Robillard spotted the truck idling in the parking lot of a nearby apartment complex. (RP

323, 325) He turned his patrol vehicle around and pulled up behind the truck. (RP 324-25) The truck pulled into an open stall as if it were going to park, but then drove rapidly over the curb and through some bushes, and sped away. (RP 325) Officer Robillard was not able to identify the occupants, but could see that there were three people in the truck. (RP 326)

Tacoma Police officers Zach Spangler and Dean Waubanasum were advised that the suspects were connected with a residence in East Tacoma, so they decided to go to that area to look for the truck. (RP 264) As they approached the residence shortly after 1:00 AM, they saw a similar truck backed up against a fence that separates the parking area from the yard. (RP 263, 265-66) They confirmed that the description and license plate matched Sumey's stolen truck. (RP 265)

But suddenly, the truck drove towards the officers' vehicle at a high rate of speed. (RP 266) The officers were afraid the truck would hit their vehicle, so they quickly accelerated to get out of the way. (RP 266) The officers were able to see that the driver was a male, and that there was one male and one female passenger. (RP 266-67)

The officers pursued the truck, which drove through several

signed intersections without stopping and reached speeds of at least 60 miles per hour in what was a 25 mile per hour zone. (RP 270-71, 297) The officers briefly lost sight of the truck as it went over a hill, but when the officers crested the hill they found that the truck had flipped over and struck a telephone pole. (RP 270, 297)

The officers rushed to assist, and found Jennings hanging out of the passenger side window and Hem trapped in the driver's seat. (RP 274, 277, 298-99, 300) Richie, who was in the middle seat, did not survive the crash. (RP 277, 280, 300)

According to Jennings, Richie participated in the assault and drove the truck away from the robbery. (RP 341-42, 348) Hem and Jennings both testified that Richie picked Hem up in the truck after the robbery. (RP 342, 348, 377-78) Hem and Jennings both testified that Hem was driving at the time of the collision.

Hem and Jennings testified that Richie told Hem to "go" when the patrol vehicle pulled up in front of the house. (RP 341, 363, 365, 369, 378) Officers also found a pipe and a baggie of what appeared to be methamphetamine in Richie's pocket, and Richie had methamphetamine in her system at the time of her death. (RP 373, 385)

V. ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES

The issues raised by Hem's petition should be addressed by this Court because the Court of Appeals' decision conflicts with settled case law of the Court of Appeals, this Court and of the United State's Supreme Court. RAP 13.4(b)(1) and (2).

"Due process requires that the State provide sufficient evidence to prove each element of its criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt." City of Tacoma v. Luvone, 118 Wn.2d 826, 849, 827 P.2d 1374 (1992) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970)). By affirming the trial court's finding of guilt, the Court of Appeals improperly relieved the State of this constitutional burden and improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defense.

- A. THE COURT OF APPEALS RELIEVED THE STATE OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL BURDEN TO PROVE THAT RICHIE WAS NOT A PARTICIPANT IN THE FELONY CRIME OF ATTEMPT TO ELUDE.

Where there are findings of fact entered following a bench trial, review is limited to whether substantial evidence supports the challenged findings, and whether the findings support the trial court's conclusions of law. State v. Alvarez, 105 Wn. App. 215, 220, 19 P.3d 485 (2001). The reviewing court evaluates the facts

by deciding whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. DeVries, 149 Wn.2d 842, 849, 72 P.3d 748 (2003) (citing State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992)).

The State charged Hem with one count of second degree felony murder pursuant to RCW 9A.32.050. (CP 28-20) That statute provides:

(1) A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:

...

(b) He or she commits or attempts to commit any felony ... and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or in immediate flight therefrom, he or she, or another participant, *causes the death of a person other than one of the participants*.[.]

(Emphasis added.) The State alleged that, in the course of committing the felony of attempting to elude, Hem caused Richie's death.¹ (CP 28-29)

Nonparticipation by the decedent "is clearly an element of the crime of second degree felony murder." State v. Langford, 67 Wn. App. 572, 579, 837 P.2d 1037 (1992) (citing RCW

¹ To prove attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, the State must prove that the defendant was the "driver of a motor vehicle who willfully fail[ed] or refuse[d] to immediately bring [his] vehicle to a stop and who [drove his] vehicle in a reckless manner while attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, after being given a visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop." RCW 46.61.024(1).

9A.32.050(1)(b)); *see also* WPIC 27.04 (the pattern to-convict instruction for second degree felony murder, listing that the decedent was not a participant in the underlying crime as one of the elements the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt). Accordingly, the State had the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Richie was *not* a participant in the crime of attempting to elude.

A “participant” is either a principal (i.e., one who actually participates directly in the commission of the crime) or an accomplice (i.e., one who meets the statutory definition of accomplice). State v. Carter, 154 Wn.2d 71, 79, 109 P.3d 823 (2005). Under RCW 9A.08.020(3)(i)-(ii), an accomplice is one who, “[w]ith knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime ... encourages ... or aids” another person in committing a crime. Our legislature has provided that anyone who participates in the commission of a crime is guilty of the crime and may be charged as a principal, regardless of the degree or nature of her participation; whether the participant “holds the gun, holds the victim, keeps a lookout, stands by ready to help the assailant, or aids in some other way,” she is a participant. State v. Davis, 101 Wn.2d 654, 658, 682 P.2d 883 (1984) (quoting State v. Carothers,

84 Wn.2d 256, 264, 525 P.2d 731 (1974)). And “an accomplice, having agreed to participate in a criminal act, runs the risk of having the primary actor exceed the scope of the preplanned illegality.” Davis, 101 Wn.2d at 658.

In this case, the State failed to prove that Richie was not a participant in the attempt to elude. Hem and Jennings testified that Richie told Hem to “go” when they were spotted by the officers. (RP 363, 378) The trial court found that this testimony was not credible. (RP 426; CP 87) But the state did not present any other testimony or evidence to show what occurred inside the cab of the truck. Therefore, there is no evidence in the record to support the trial court’s factual finding that Hem “made all decisions regarding how to drive.” (CP 87) And this finding cannot support the trial court’s legal conclusion that Richie was not a participant in the attempt to elude. (CP 87, 89)

The remaining evidence that was presented at trial certainly does not indicate that Richie was not a participant. Richie was in the back seat of Thomas’ car when the assault on Sumey began. (RP 202, 207, 236) But rather than staying there, Richie got out of the car and into a truck she had to know was in the process of being stolen. She was in the truck during the first attempt to flee,

when the truck accelerated over a curb and through some bushes. (RP 326) But she still did not remove herself from the ongoing criminal activities, and instead was inside the truck when it was spotted at the East Tacoma residence. (RP 266-67) Richie was also under the influence of methamphetamine and in possession of a controlled substance, and so had her own motive to flee the police. (RP 373, 385)

From this evidence, no reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Richie was not a participant in the attempt to elude. The Court of Appeals even noted that the officer “did not see Richie try to get out of the truck” and “saw nothing to indicate Richie ... did not want to be in the truck.” (Opinion at 2) Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals concluded that the State met its burden of proof, stating:

Hem drove the stolen truck and made all driving decisions. Hem was used to being on the run and had the instinct to flee. He sped and drove recklessly while attempting to elude the officers. This circumstantial evidence demonstrates that Hem made up his mind about how to drive. There is no credible evidence Richie solicited, commanded, encouraged, or requested Hem to commit an attempt to elude. She was merely present and mere presence even with knowledge of criminal activity is insufficient for accomplice liability. Sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding.

(Opinion at 6)

The Court's reliance on these facts is misplaced. First, Richie could still be a participant or accomplice even if Hem "made all of the decisions" about how to drive. And the fact that Hem had an "instinct" to flee and then did so at high speeds does not mean that Richie did not solicit or encourage him to do so. Second, there did not need to be credible evidence that Richie "solicited, commanded, encouraged, or requested Hem to commit an attempt to elude." Rather, there needed to be credible evidence that she did *not* solicit, command, encourage, or request that Hem attempt to elude the pursuing officers. There was no such evidence. Instead, the facts clearly showed that Richie was not "merely present."

The reviewing court should reverse a conviction and dismiss the prosecution for insufficient evidence where no rational trier of fact could find that all elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hardesty, 129 Wn.2d 303, 309, 915 P.2d 1080 (1996); State v. Hickman, 135 Wn.2d 97, 103, 954 P.2d 900 (1998). Accordingly, Hem's conviction for second degree felony murder must be reversed and dismissed.

- B. THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY ALLOWED THE PROSECUTOR AND THE JUDGE TO IMPROPERLY SHIFT THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO HEM BY REQUIRING EVIDENCE THAT RICHIE WAS A PARTICIPANT IN THE FELONY CRIME OF ATTEMPT TO ELUDE.

The State bears the burden of proving every element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and it may not shift any part of that burden to the defendant. Winship, 397 U.S. at 361; State v. Fleming, 83 Wn. App. 209, 215, 912 P.2d 1076 (1996); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701-02, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1975). As a result, the defendant has no burden to present any evidence at all. See Fleming, 83 Wn. App. at 215.

In a bench trial, the reviewing court presumes that a trial judge will disregard inadmissible matters when making findings, and will apply the law correctly. See State v. Adams, 91 Wn.2d 86, 93, 586 P.2d 1168 (1978); State v. Read, 147 Wn.2d 238, 245-46, 53 P.3d 26 (2002).

However, that presumption can be overcome with evidence that the trial judge misapplied the law. For example, in State v. Cantu, 156 Wn.2d 819, 826-27, 132 P.3d 725 (2006), the juvenile defendant was convicted of residential burglary after a bench trial. This Court first noted that a trier of fact may employ a permissive inference of intent to commit that crime whenever the evidence

shows a person enters or remains unlawfully in a building. Cantu, 156 Wn.2d at 832 (citing RCW 9A.52.040; State v. Grimes, 92 Wn. App. 973, 980 n. 2, 966 P.2d 394 (1998)). But this Court reversed Cantu's conviction because the judge employed a *mandatory* presumption of intent and improperly shifted the burden to disprove intent to the defense:

Due process requires the State to bear the "burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of a crime." A fair reading of the record leads us to conclude that the trial judge relieved the State of this burden by creating a mandatory presumption of criminal intent which Cantu was required to rebut. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals, vacate the conviction without prejudice, and remand for further proceedings[.]

Cantu, 156 Wn.2d at 829 (citations omitted).

As noted above, the State must prove that the decedent is *not* a participant in the underlying felony in order to convict a defendant of the crime of second degree felony murder.² But in this case the prosecutor and the judge shifted the burden away from the State and placed the burden on Hem to prove that Richie was a participant. When the prosecutor made his closing argument to the judge, he stated:

The accomplice in this case, Ms. Richie, *this is the*

² RCW 9A.32.050(1)(b); WPIC 27.04; Langford, 67 Wn. App. at 579.

defense position because they are saying she's a participant based on the evidence, must associate herself with the venture and participate in it as something she wishes to bring about, and by an action do something to make it succeed. ... Elude, there has to be some action on the part of Ms. Richie that the Court finds in evidence that shows she did something, an action, in order to help this joint action, this crime. Her presence at the commission of the crime, even with knowledge of the crime, does not subject her to criminal liability, unless she shares the criminal intent of Mr. Hem, and she demonstrates a community of unlawful purpose.

(RP 389, emphasis added) According to the prosecutor, because Hem's "position" was that Richie was a participant in the attempt to elude, the judge had to find evidence to support this position. But the State bore the burden of establishing that Richie was *not* a participant.

In its oral ruling, the judge adopts the prosecutor's reasoning and states:

Because it is clear that the defendant was driving during the elude that ended in Ms. Richie's death, the Court must look at whether or not Ms. Richie was an accomplice to the elude.

...

The credible evidence does not support a finding that Ms. Richie was an accomplice to the Attempting to Elude charge, therefore the Court finds the defendant guilty of the crime of Murder in the Second Degree.

(RP 425-27, emphasis added) The trial court believed it must find

evidence of participation by Richie in order to acquit, when in fact the court was required to find evidence of nonparticipation by Richie in order to convict.

Then in its written findings, the trial court states that “[c]redible evidence does not support that Ms. Richie was an accomplice.” (CP 87, emphasis added) Although this unequivocally shows that the trial court misunderstood the State’s burden in this case, the Court of Appeals merely finds that “[t]he wording of the trial court’s finding could be clearer” and that this finding is “insufficient to rebut the presumption that the trial court applies the law correctly.” (Opinion at 9) The Court of Appeals is wrong—this finding is clear, and shows the trial court judge misapplied the law by shifting the burden of proof.

The trial court misunderstood the elements of the crime and the required proof, and convicted Hem using the incorrect standard. The trial court thereby relieved the State of its burden of proving an essential element of the crime of second degree murder, and improperly shifted the burden to Hem to disprove his guilt. This error requires that Hem’s second degree murder conviction be reversed and that his case be remanded for a new trial. Cantu, 156 Wn.2d at 829.

VI. CONCLUSION

It is irrelevant whether there was sufficient proof to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Richie was a participant, because the State had the burden of proving that she was *not* a participant. The State failed to meet that burden. The trial court also failed in its responsibility to hold the State to its constitutional burden of proof. This Court should accept review, and reverse Hem's second degree felony murder conviction.

DATED: May 23, 2018



STEPHANIE C. CUNNINGHAM, WSB #26436
Attorney for Petitioner Anthony Samnang Hem

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on 05/23/2018, I caused to be placed in the mails of the United States, first class postage pre-paid, a copy of this document addressed to: Anthony S. Hem, DOC# 342355, Coyote Ridge Corrections Center, P.O. Box 769, Connell, WA 99326-0769.



STEPHANIE C. CUNNINGHAM, WSBA #26436

APPENDIX

Court of Appeals Opinion in State v. Anthony Samnang Hem, No. 49811-1-II

April 24, 2018

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

ANTHONY SAMNANG HEM.

Appellant.

No. 49811-1-II

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MELNICK, J. — Anthony Samnang Hem challenges his conviction following a bench trial for felony murder in the second degree (felony murder), with an underlying predicate of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle (attempt to elude).¹ Hem argues insufficient evidence exists that the victim was not a participant in the predicate felony, that the prosecutor committed misconduct by shifting the burden of proof in closing argument, and that the court also shifted the burden. Hem filed a statement of additional grounds (SAG) relating to his sentencing. We affirm.

FACTS

Hem drove recklessly and caused Marisa Richie's death. Richie and Pierre Jennings rode in a stolen truck Hem drove while the police chased him.

¹ The court also convicted Hem of robbery in the first degree; however, Hem does not appeal from that conviction. In his statement of additional grounds, Hem makes assertions for reversal or modification of his sentence for robbery in the first degree

Approximately ninety minutes before the chase, Richie, Hem and Jennings sat in a parked car in a parking spot assigned to Terry Sumey. Sumey approached the three and asked them to move the car. Hem and Jennings punched and repeatedly kicked Sumey. Hem, Jennings and Richie left the scene in Sumey's truck.

Approximately ninety minutes after the above incident, Officers Zach Spangler and Dean Waubanasum saw Sumey's truck parked at a residence.² While approaching the truck, Spangler turned on his patrol vehicle's spotlight. Hem immediately started the engine, drove the truck directly at the driver's side door of the officers' vehicle, and then sped off. He reached speeds of between 80 and 100 miles per hour. Spangler saw figures in the truck. RP at 266. Spangler saw a male driver, a female passenger in the middle seat, and another male passenger.

Hem drove recklessly. He ran stop signs and red lights. He drove on the wrong side of the road with his lights off, and he hit another vehicle. Hem crashed the truck into a power pole. Spangler could see Hem, Jennings, and Richie inside the cab of the truck, Spangler did not see Richie try to get out of the truck or interfere with Hem's driving. Spangler saw nothing to indicate Richie wanted to or did not want to be in the truck.

Hem plead guilty to attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, vehicular assault of Jennings, assault in the second degree of Spangler and Waubanasum, and vehicular homicide of Richie. In his guilty plea, Hem admitted he knowingly drove Sumey's truck recklessly while attempting to outrun a police vehicle, resulting in a collision that caused Richie's death.

² Prior to this time, another officer saw the stolen truck in a different parking lot and approached it in his patrol car. The officer saw three occupants. The "truck sped up rapidly, went over the curb, over some bushes, across the sidewalk and off the curb before speeding away." Report of Proceedings (RP) (Sept. 7, 12 & Oct. 21, 2016) at 325. The officer told dispatch he had located the stolen truck, but he could not maneuver out of the parking lot in time to pursue the vehicle.

Hem waived his right to a jury on the remaining counts of felony murder and robbery in the first degree. The State charged attempt to elude as the predicate felony to the felony murder charge.

The trial court found Hem guilty of both felony murder and robbery in the first degree. The court entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law, including findings that the testimony of Hem and Jennings was not credible, that Hem “was the driver and made all decisions regarding how to drive,” that “[c]redible evidence does not support that Ms. Richie was an accomplice” to the attempt to elude and, thus, was not a participant in the underlying felony. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 86-87.

The court sentenced Hem to 360 months for felony murder, 171 months for robbery in the first degree, 144 months for vehicular homicide, 84 months for vehicular assault, and 84 months for assault in the second degree. The court merged the attempt to elude conviction with the felony murder conviction, denied Hem’s motion to merge the convictions for vehicular homicide and felony murder, and concluded that vehicular homicide and felony murder do not constitute the same criminal conduct.³ The court ordered all sentences to run concurrently for a total of 360 months custody. Hem appeals.

ANALYSIS

I. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Hem argues insufficient evidence exists to prove Richie’s nonparticipation in the attempt to elude or to convict Hem of felony murder.⁴ Hem challenges the trial court’s finding that he

³ Hem stipulated to an offender score of six based on five prior adult convictions and two juvenile convictions counting as half a point.

⁴ Hem’s raises the same argument in his SAG. We address it here.

“was the driver and made all decisions regarding how to drive[.]” Br. of Appellant at 1. Hem also challenges the trial court’s finding that Richie was not a participant in the attempt to elude.

A. Legal Principles

We review challenged findings of fact in a criminal bench trial for substantial evidence. Review is limited to determining “whether substantial evidence supports the challenged findings of fact and whether the findings support the trial court’s conclusions of law.” *State v. Smith*, 185 Wn. App. 945, 956, 344 P.3d 1244 (2015). “Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded, rational person that the findings are true.” *Smith*, 185 Wn. App. at 956.

Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. *State v. Stevenson*, 128 Wn. App. 179, 193, 114 P.3d 699 (2005). “Direct and circumstantial evidence carry the same weight.” *State v. Hart*, 195 Wn. App. 449, 457, 381 P.3d 142 (2016), *review denied*, 187 Wn.2d 1011 (2017). “Credibility determinations are for the trier of fact and are not subject to review.” *Hart*, 195 Wn. App. at 457.

A person is guilty of felony murder if he commits any felony and, “in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or in immediate flight therefrom,” he “causes the death of a person *other than one of the participants*” in the underlying felony. RCW 9A.32.050(1)(b) (emphasis added). Nonparticipation by the victim in the underlying felony “is clearly an element of the crime of second degree felony murder.” *State v. Langford*, 67 Wn. App. 572, 579, 837 P.2d 1037 (1992).

At trial, the court admitted Hem’s plea of guilty proving every element of felony murder, except Richie’s nonparticipation in the attempt to elude.

B. Challenged Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law

Hem challenges the finding that he “was the driver and made all decisions regarding how to drive[.]” Br. of Appellant at 1-2. He also challenges the finding that Richie was not a participant in the attempt to elude.

1. Hem Drove and Made All Driving Decisions.

There is substantial evidence to support the finding that Hem “was the driver and made all decisions regarding how to drive.” CP at 87. In pleading guilty, Hem admitted to driving during the attempt to elude. Hem also testified that he was “used to being on the run,” and that it was his “instinct” to flee. RP (Sept. 7, 12 & Oct. 21, 2016) at 378. The speed and recklessness of Hem’s driving also indicated that Hem made all driving decisions. Based on those facts, substantial evidence supports the finding that Hem drove and made all driving decisions during the attempt to elude.

2. Richie was Not a Participant.

Hem argues insufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Richie was not a participant in the attempt to elude. He claims “the State presented no evidence to establish that [Richie] did not participate,” because the State did not present “testimony or evidence to show what occurred inside the cab of the truck.” Br. of Appellant at 2, 11.

An accomplice is one who, with knowledge she is promoting or facilitating the specific crime charged, either “[s]olicits, commands, encourages, or requests [another] person to commit” the crime; or “[a]ids or agrees to aid [another] person in planning or committing” the crime. RCW 9A.08.020(3)(a)(i) & (ii); *State v. Moran*, 119 Wn. App. 197, 210, 81 P.3d 122 (2003). Mere

physical presence, even with knowledge of ongoing criminal activity, is insufficient to establish accomplice culpability. *State v. Truong*, 168 Wn. App. 529, 540, 277 P.3d 74 (2012). However, knowledge that one is promoting an ongoing crime by encouraging the principal actor, with the intent that the crime succeed, is sufficient to prove accomplice liability. *In re Welfare of Wilson*, 91 Wn.2d 487, 491, 588 P.2d 1161 (1979).

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Richie was not a participant. Hem drove the stolen truck and made all driving decisions. Hem was used to being on the run and had the instinct to flee. He sped and drove recklessly while attempting to elude the officers. This circumstantial evidence demonstrates that Hem made up his mind about how to drive. There is no credible evidence Richie solicited, commanded, encouraged, or requested Hem to commit an attempt to elude.⁵ She was merely present and mere presence even with knowledge of criminal activity is insufficient for accomplice liability. Sufficient evidence supported the trial court's finding.

II. BURDEN SHIFTING

A. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Hem argues that in closing argument the prosecutor committed misconduct by shifting the burden of proof regarding Richie's nonparticipation in the attempt to elude.

The State bears the burden of proving every element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and may not shift any part of that burden to the defendant. *In re Matter of Winship*, 397 U.S. 358, 361, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970); *State v. Cantu*, 156 Wn.2d 819, 825, 132 P.3d 725 (2006).

⁵ Although Hem presented evidence that Richie told him to "go," the trial court found that Hem's testimony on this point lacked credibility. CP at 87. We do not review credibility determinations. *Hart*, 195 Wn. App. at 457.

An assignment of error based on improper statements by a prosecutor at trial is waived where there is no objection at trial, unless the remark is “so flagrant and ill intentioned that it causes an enduring and resulting prejudice that could not have been neutralized.” *State v. Thorgerson*, 172 Wn.2d 438, 443, 258 P.3d 43, 46 (2011) (quoting *State v. Russell*, 125 Wn.2d 24, 86, 882 P.2d 747 (1994)). We presume the trial court judge in a bench trial disregards improper argument and improper evidence, applying the law correctly and avoiding any prejudice that might result from even flagrant and ill-intentioned statements by a prosecutor. *State v. Adams*, 91 Wn.2d 86, 93, 586 P.2d 1168 (1978); *State v. Read*, 147 Wn.2d 238, 245-46, 53 P.2d 26 (2002).

Hem challenges the following statement of the prosecutor during closing argument:

Richie, this is the defense position because they are saying she’s a participant *That’s part of what has to be shown, usually by the State, to show that a person is an accomplice, in this case as a participant [T]here has to be some action on the part of Ms. Richie that the Court finds in evidence that shows she did something Her presence at the commission of the crime, even with knowledge of the crime, does not subject her to criminal liability, unless she shares the criminal intent of Mr. Hem, and she demonstrates a community of unlawful purpose.”*

RP (Sept. 7, 12 & Oct. 21, 2016) at 389 (emphasis added). Hem did not object. Additionally, the following comment by the prosecutor preceded the challenged statement:

the defense would have to prove, since they decided to put on evidence—*they wouldn’t have to prove, let me qualify that*—the defense’s evidence is to suggest a reasonable doubt exists because.

RP Sept. 7, 12 & Oct. 21, 2016) at 388.

The State agrees it had the burden to prove Richie’s nonparticipation in the underlying felony beyond a reasonable doubt. The State argues the prosecutor’s statement did not shift the burden and, even if it had, Hem waived the assignment of error and suffered no prejudice because the judge was the trier of fact.

We conclude that the prosecutor's statement, when viewed in context, was not flagrant and ill-intentioned. The prosecutor clearly started to misstate the applicable burden of proof on Richie's nonparticipation as an accomplice in the underlying felony, but immediately corrected himself.

Because the prosecutor did not shift the burden, there is no misconduct.

B. Court Applied Correct Burden of Proof.

Hem argues the trial court applied the incorrect burden of proof on Richie's nonparticipation in the underlying felony in its written and oral findings of fact.

Washington is a written order state. A trial court's oral decision has no binding or final effect unless the court formally incorporates the oral decision into the findings of fact and conclusions of law and the judgment and sentence. *State v. Dailey*, 93 Wn.2d 454, 458-59, 610 P.2d 357 (1980); *State v. McReynolds*, 142 Wn. App. 941, 949, 176 P.3d 616 (2008). We will not review the trial court's oral findings.

As to written findings of fact and conclusions of law in a bench trial, we presume the trial court judge applies the law correctly, including the burden of proof. *Adams*, 91 Wn.2d at 93; *Read*, 147 Wn.2d at 245-46. However, the challenging party can rebut the presumption by showing the trial court judge misunderstood and misapplied the law. *Cantu*, 156 Wn.2d at 825.

Hem contends the trial court's written finding that "[c]redible evidence does not support that Ms. Richie *was* an accomplice," shows the trial court judge misapplied the law by shifting the burden of proof. CP at 87 (emphasis added). If the court applied the correct burden, Hem claims it would have said it found credible evidence does support that Richie *was not* an accomplice.

Hem had no burden to produce any evidence that Richie participated. The State had the burden of proving that Richie was not an accomplice.

The wording of the trial court's finding could be clearer, but it is insufficient to rebut the presumption that the trial court applies the law correctly. We read the court's finding as a statement that the court weighed the evidence and made a credibility determination. It does not indicate that it applied the wrong burden of proof.

IV. SAG

Hem's SAG also raises additional grounds for reversal or modification of his sentence.

A. Age as a Substantial and Compelling Factor Warranting a Lesser Sentence

Hem challenges the length of his standard range sentences, asserting that his relative youth compared to Richie's justified a sentence below the standard range.⁶ He was twenty-three when he committed the offenses; Richie was twenty-seven.

Hem failed to preserve this assertion. RAP 2.5(a). Hem did not request an exceptional sentence in his sentencing memorandum or at the sentencing hearing. Hem's counsel only requested sentences at the low end of the standard range for each conviction.

We will not consider Hem's assertion on this point because he was over the age of eighteen, and therefore failed to assert violation of a manifest error affecting a constitutional right. *State v. Houston-Sconiers*, 188 Wn.2d 1, 19-20, 391 P.3d 409 (2017); RAP 2.5(a).

⁶ Hem's SAG also states that the "sentencing court erroneously believed it ha[d] no discretion in [his] sentencing." SAG at 12. The sole basis for this claim is the statement by the sentencing judge at Hem's sentencing that Hem was a young man "looking at a long prison sentence no matter what this court does." SAG at 12 (quoting RP (Sept. 7, 12 & Oct. 21, 2016) at 441). The claim does not support a reasonable inference that the trial court judge did not exercise its discretion.

B. Length of Sentence as Cruel or Unusual Punishment

Hem argues that his 360-month sentence violates article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution. In support, Hem refers to *State v. Fain*, 94 Wn.2d 387, 617 P.2d 720 (1980), and *State v. Witherspoon*, 180 Wn.2d 875, 887, 329 P.3d 888 (2014). However, Hem makes no effort to explain why the court should conclude that his sentence constitutes cruel or unusual punishment based on those cases. Unlike the defendant in *Fain*, the trial court did not sentence Hem to life on minor predicate offenses. Hem did not state any reason why his sentence offends “evolving standards of decency,” as it did in *Fain*. 94 Wn.2d at 397 (quoting *Trop v. Dulles*, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S. Ct. 590, 2 L. Ed. 2d 630 (1958)). Accordingly, Hem’s challenge on this basis fails.

C. Same Criminal Conduct

Hem asserts that the trial court erred in finding that his convictions for robbery in the first degree, felony murder, and vehicular homicide are not the same criminal conduct for sentencing purposes.

We utilize an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a trial court’s determination of what constitutes the same criminal conduct. *State v. Knight*, 176 Wn. App. 936, 959, 309 P.3d 776 (2013). The trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. *State v. Powell*, 126 Wn.2d 244, 258, 893 P.2d 615 (1995). We narrowly construe the same criminal conduct analysis. *State v. Porter*, 133 Wn.2d 177, 181, 942 P.2d 974 (1997); *State v. Wilson*, 136 Wn. App. 596, 613, 150 P.3d 144 (2007).

Generally, the trial court determines the sentencing range for each current offense by calculating the offender score based on other current offenses and prior convictions. RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a); *State v. Vike*, 125 Wn.2d 407, 410, 885 P.2d 824 (1994). If the trial court finds that all or some of the current offenses encompass “the same criminal conduct,” those offenses

count as one crime. RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a). The statute defines “same criminal conduct” as “two or more crimes that require the same criminal intent, are committed at the same time and place, and involve the same victim.” RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a). If any of these elements is not met, the trial court must score each offense separately. *Knight*, 176 Wn. App. at 959.

Hem asserts that the offenses occurred at the same place and time, involved the same victims, and that Hem’s objective intent did not change from one crime to the next. He asks us to remand for rescoring of the convictions for robbery in the first degree, felony murder, and vehicular homicide as one offense.

Robbery in the first degree is not the same criminal conduct as the vehicular homicide or felony murder in this case. Hem robbed Sumey more than an hour and a half before Richie died. The time, place, and victim of the robbery differed from the time, place, and victim of the vehicular homicide and felony murder. It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court judge to score the robbery separately from the felony murder and vehicular homicide.

Additionally, the trial court judge did not abuse his discretion by scoring felony murder and vehicular homicide separately. The judge concluded the two offenses did not constitute the same criminal conduct because Hem’s intent was different for each offense. For the felony murder charge, Hem intended to elude the police. For the vehicular homicide charge, Hem had to drive recklessly. Hem’s challenge on this ground fails.

D. Merger

Finally, Hem asserts the trial court erred in declining to merge the convictions for vehicular homicide, felony murder, and robbery in the first degree.

Whether the merger doctrine bars multiple sentences for two or more offenses is a question of law we review de novo. *State v. Freeman*, 153 Wn.2d 765, 770, 108 P.3d 753 (2005). Courts merge convictions where “a criminal act forbidden under one statute elevates the degree of a crime under another statute,” if the “legislature intended to punish both acts through a single conviction for the greater crime.” *Knight*, 176 Wn. App. at 952.


Initially, we note that the robbery in the first degree conviction in this case did not elevate either the vehicular homicide or felony murder charges. The assault underlying the conviction for robbery in the first degree is the assault of Sumey, and the State did not charge Hem separately for that assault. Merger doctrine does not bar a separate sentence for the robbery.

Additionally, merger does not bar multiple sentences for felony murder and vehicular homicide. In *In re Pers. Restraint of Percer*, 150 Wn.2d 41, 50, 75 P.3d 488 (2003), the court concluded that the legislature did not intent to punish vehicular homicide and felony murder through a single conviction for felony murder. The court held that “vehicular homicide and second degree felony murder are not the same offenses” because each “contains an element not included in the other;” specifically, vehicular homicide requires that “driving [] a vehicle” caused the victim’s death, and felony murder requires that the defendant was acting “in the course of or in furtherance of a felony” when causing the victim’s death. *Percer*, 150 Wn.2d at 50. Hem’s challenge on this basis fails.


Accordingly, Hem’s convictions for robbery in the first degree, felony murder, and vehicular homicide do not merge.


We affirm.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.


Melnick, J.

We concur:


Johanson, J.


Maxa, C.J.

May 23, 2018 - 11:41 AM

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